Retour au menu
Retour au menu
 

 
The ISM designated person ashore: what a job!
The page of the ISM Code N°15 rev 2 (2014 & 2018)



Being aware of the continued misinterpretation of some parts of the ISM code, I started to review my specific article on the subject issued 13 years ago. It is a pity to see the errors still appearing in the numerous SMS (Safety Management System) I encounter during my assignments as an ISM specialist.
The present reviewed study takes into account the circular MSC-MEPC.7/Circ.8 which was specifically issued to clarify some points like the present one.

NB: I gave up to discuss with certification bodies or RO which are still accepting such stupid mistakes as "the CEO can be the DPA and vice & versa".

2018 review:
Called IDP, DP, DPA or another PD, this key person of the ISM code has badly run some ink already, but I would like to make here an exhaustive assessment of this problem because…it is a real problem isn't?
  1. Warning
  2. The ISM Code presents some requirements which must be regarded as a minimum and the base, any additional requirement can come only from the flag or Port State, the company itself or the ship.

    Reference: ISM Code § 4 DESIGNATED PERSON (S)
    To ensure the safe operation of each ship and to provide a link between the Company and those on board, every Company, as appropriate, should designate a person or persons ashore having direct access to the highest level of management. The responsibility and authority of the designated person or persons should include monitoring the safety and pollution prevention aspects of the operation of each ship and ensuring that adequate resources and shore-based support are applied, as required.
  3. History
  4. The idea of a code for management was in the spirit of the maritime industry since the middle of the Eighties, however the concept of the Designated Person Ashore appeared only after the accident of HOFE (HERALD OF FREE ENTERPRISE) on 6.3.87 at the exit of ZEEBRUGE HARBOUR causing the loss of 188 human lives.
    Deeply shocked by this accident, the British "invented" the Designated Person.
    He acts, in addition to the normal staff of a traditional shipping company, to have one or more persons especially designated to ensure a reliable connection between the management and the seafarers and to supervise the operations of their ships as well as to ensure that adequate resources and support to the ship and her crew is provided.

    Why?
    Remember, the Management of Townsend-Thoresen was recognized guilty of failure in the management of safety of its ferries and it was estimated that a person particularly designated to deal with the problems of safety in the company was missing.
    This failure was regarded as one of the causes of the accident. This was perhaps the case in this company, but in the majority of the other shipping companies, a marine superintendent – with assistants for large companies - was traditionally the "Safety Officer" in charge of all the problems of safety of ships and operations.

    The General Management of TOWNSEND THORESEN reorganized its management structure after the trial and named an Operation manager having a marine qualification…. However, apparently, they did not understand completely the recommendations of Lord SHEEN!

    Really pragmatic, the British Administration was going further, indeed since 1988, they required for their companies, the designation of a person to ensure the communication and "to supervise" the operations of ships: this is already about a "controller" rather than of a person in charge of safety who was traditionally in charge of the application of the international safety requirements (SOLAS, LL, STCW, MARPOL, COLREG or ILO) in the company and on board ships.
    This concept of Designated Person Ashore presented by the British Delegation had problems to enter in the successive resolutions of IMO on the management of safety; once again it is a dramatic accident, the fire on board “SCANDINAVIAN STAR” in April 90 resulting in 158 dead, which has boosted the Resolution A 680 in 1991 and then the famous Resolution A 741 in 1993 which is the official birth of the ISM Code such as we know it.
    The concept of the Designated Person Ashore was maintained by the British Delegation and thus finally ratified in its current form by the working group on the ISM (human element WG) then by the MSC and finally by the 17th Assembly of IMO in 93.
  5. Study of the text of the code:
  6. Though written in a strange manner, the text is quite clear: the responsibilities and the minimum authority of the DPA (Designated Person Ashore) are found hereafter (NB the text has not been amended since the beginning!)

    • Provide a link between the Company and those on board, … a person ashore having direct access to the highest level of management
    • By highest management we include the decisional level in particular at the financial level and when we speak about those aboard, we think of all the crew members because if not, the code would have said the ship or the Master!
      This lack of communication was clarified by the court in the accident of HOFE and specifies in its “attendus”: "the need for… maintenance of proper channels of communication between Ship and Shore for the receipt and dissemination of information"

    • The responsibility and authority of the designated person or persons should include monitoring the safety and pollution prevention aspects of the operation of each ship (which we will call monitoring task N°1):
    • Often forgotten, this responsibility of the Designated Person is not simple to ensure. Indeed, how, from shore, supervise the operations of each ship concerning safety and environmental protection?
      Bad habits taken by the crews of TOWNSEND THORESEN (several ships were concerned) to leave the port with ship's doors open and/or with a negative trim of almost 1m, would have perhaps been abandoned if a person, charged to supervise the operations, had informed the highest level of the management of these bad habits … who then could have modified the ships' schedules accordingly.

    • Ensuring that adequate resources and shore-based support are applied, as required. (called monitoring task N°2):
    • The requests of the HOFE's Captains (and others Masters) who had taken their responsibility in these bad practices with unique commercial aim (departure “before” the time, arrival “on time”, “maximum” of passengers or freight) were not granted but did not receive any answer … not even a verbal refusal!

    Remember, they asked for:
    • Warning lamps for the opening of the front doors (doors were invisible from the bridge), request which amused the "directors" really… they acknowledge in front of the court!
    • Replacement of the ballast pump by a more powerful one to accelerate the correction of trim after the departure
    • Request for calculation of stability in this significant negative trim situation (abnormal situation not studied in the stability booklet!)
    These captains' requests were thus blocked at the Company operations level by one or more of the non-competent persons in the fields concerned.

    A qualified person ashore having these competences and seeing these requests could have intervened and at least ensured an answer to the Masters.
    NB The legal implications of the responsibilities for the designated person appeared very quickly in the industry and the opinions or studies are published since 1996.
  7. What is this job finally?
    1. Connection task

    2. This connection is significant, universally understood and applied: it is a question of ensuring a reliable communication between the highest management level and the persons on board each ship.
      Connections between the Captains and the top management generally exist. For smaller companies, the problem does not arise (the General Manager is always close to his ships which are sometimes his own assets), for others ... perhaps, though today a Captain always can, via mail or e mail or mobile phone, contact directly the General manager". So, we do not need a Designated Person for that: that is a common answer!
      Traditionally the other officers on board have frequent connections with the persons in charge ashore (the Chief Engineer with the Technical Superintendent, the Chief Officer with the Safety Officer, the Purser with the Head of Catering department etc.).
      The other crewmembers have means of communication with the Marine Superintendent or the Management ashore via their heads of department, their representatives on board (trade-union or safety representative, safety committee etc…) when they exist.

      So, why do they need another communication method?

      It is of course about another communication method, which could be used, if the traditional ways mentioned above, would not work!
      The causes can be multiple:
      • Dysfunction at the intermediate level (case of the HOFE)
      • Dysfunction at the Captain's level: not taken into account or personal implication of the Captain (case of the COSTA CONCORDIA)
      • Dysfunction at the level of the head of department (not taken into account or oversight)
      • Quite simply, at the level of the crew members, timidity or fear of reactions of close or immediate management: existing culture in to day multi-national crews (Case of the BOW MARINER)
      It is to compensate this type of dysfunction and to create a communication method which will work every time: the ISM way!

      So, the ISM way is a parallel way, used when the normal or traditional ways do not work: it is a sort of by-pass!

      This supplementary communication way:
      • Applied in the case of the HOFE, the accident would certainly have been avoided: via the designated person the captains reach the CEO (Chief Executive Officer) who, knowing very well his own responsibilities when he is informed, will hasten to find the solution because the obligation of "due diligence" which is of primary importance for the insurer and the court!
      • Applied to other cases (COSTA CONCORDIA or BOW MARINER) where behaviour of Master or officers did not correspond to their responsibilities (in front of daily crew's assessment), this connection would perhaps have avoided some dramas (recent spectacular groundings, former dramatic jettison of stowaways)
      • Etc…
      This interpretation is well accepted with the crews by however training or adequate information in order to avoid some mistakes as: ISM way used to claim or settle a score!

      NB This way is to be used with intelligence of course and the DPA must be capable to try to regulate the problem at the operational level before going to strike at the "big boss" level. Today the DPA has his own budget and the possibility to order within a certain budget fixed by the finance management (this joined the monitoring N°2, see next)



Consequently, the Safety Management System (SMS) of the company must envisage the operation of this connection:
  • Reality of the possibility for the designated person to contact the CEO for a problem which cannot be solved at the operational level

  • Proof of evidence of transmission (email/recording/letter)

  • The name and the role of DPA are known of all persons on board; more-over small posters on the bridge and in crew accommodations will give all directions

  • The designated person (or her substitute) can be contacted 24/7 mainly by telephone or email.
The SMS will not forget to specify the responsibilities for DPA in this transmission.
 
Elementary flow chart of the ISM communication way
      In the event of accident, the court looking for the cause, will seek who did not ensure "due diligence". The responsibility of the designated person could be required if by misfortune, he did not transmit to the head of company significant information concerning to a possible cause of accident, as it is his duty according to the ISM Code.

      Often, to frighten a little, the designated person who had not seen these possible consequences of his acts, I speak of the maximum sentencing they risk in the event of judgement in the United Kingdom (£ 5.000 and/or 2 years) …and more in USA … hard!

    1. Monitoring N° 1

    2. It is materially impossible to ensure the monitoring of safety of the operations of each ship without having on each ship a person to do it!
      Many authors have failed by proposing many solutions… except the good one!

      Indeed, the DPA can ensure part of this monitoring via visits/inspections on board during calls or trips, the follow-up of shipboard recordings as safety drills reports, familiarisation recordings, maintenance and periodic tests of all ship's equipment, safety and training meetings, orders for repairs or spare parts, captains reviews and of course the internal audits ... but it is only a control a fortiori!
      Indeed, nothing is better than control on the spot, during the operations!

      So, do we need a representative of the designated person on board, a controller in situ in charge of supervising… the work of the others?

      It is surprising that only a few persons, to my knowledge, have seen that the code itself had envisaged the solution: remember, the responsibilities of the Captain include that he must "verify that specified requirements are observed " (ISM Code § 5.1.4) i.e. he must supervise:
      • that all ship's operations, all activities are carried out as they should be,
      • that the ship must be in a state such as it has been envisaged by rules and regulations and … the SMS!
      • etc…
      … the Captain is thus the natural representative of the designated person on board !
      These tasks of continuous monitoring and especially of remote monitoring for the DPA require obviously an excellent knowledge of the operations to be supervised.
      The relations between the DPA and the Captain are thus privileged relations corresponding to the § 4 of the ISM Code

    3. Monitoring N° 2

    4. This task includes the insurance that adequate resources and shore-based support are applied.
      It is about the demands of the ship in a form of orders, work request, urgent or not, to be planned for the next dry-dock refit, replacement of officers or rating etc…
      But even with ISM well trained crews, sometimes the limit between general claims and demands linked with safety is unfortunately not clear. Demands are often presented with an emphasis on safety in order to stress the demand. For example, to reconsider the risk of fatigue, the manning crew level is considered as a possible cause of accident despite the validity of the safe manning certificate! & so on!
      We do not forget the usual claims for money or holidays coming from all seafarers around the world!
      The DPA will have to intervene for routine orders when the cost is high. The reasons of refusal are always the same: budget, high consumption, too expensive & so on… remember, a new transfer ballast pump for the HOFE was too expensive!
      Then, the action of the DPA in addition of control includes a moderation task (the demands can be exaggerated (all seafarers always ask for more in order to get enough!) mixed with a mediation in case of dispute about cost, delays & so on … especially when the safety of the ship or the marine environment can be in jeopardy.

      Practically speaking, to allow the DPA to ensure this task of support, he must be aware of the flow of communications between ship and shore managers to help her to intervene if necessary. Today, with electronic communications via intranet or internet, it is easy to put the DPA in copy of all mails concerning the shipmaster's demand and the final decision, the works ordered to the shipyard and the works effectively carried out for example.
      Another method can be to wait for claims from the demanding people in case of refusal by their department. This way should be normally refused due to always the same reason: the crew sometimes prefer to abandon their demand because of a certain timidity or different culture as seen before and for this reason the link is really not guaranteed. As an alternative, this way can take the “reporting way” as exposed in the § 9 of the ISM code. The refusal is there considered as non-conformity and follows the process to reach the highest level. Sorry this way of reporting has not been designed for that; so, if this way is common in the company, the DPA way is not working properly and the auditor should declare as a nonconform management system. Unfortunately, this system is quite frequent and I used to lose my temper many times when trying to explain.

      In conclusion, the DPA will not be able to ensure that the company brings its adequate supports to the ship, only being aware about the needs expressed by the ship/crew and the conditions of these requests.

      So, the DPA must be on the circuit of the ships' requests about safety and prevention of pollution in normal conditions (stores or demand of repairs or technical refit and the repairs effectively carried out or not) or in emergency (specific Captain's requests to help him to manage the situation). So ,the DPA must be in the crisis cell to see and to ensure the Master's needs are provided to deal with the emergency.

      The DPA, and this is linked to our § 4.1 above, often has the possibility to answer requests refused by another budget but, at a certainly lower financial level (the management is there for removing a pain in his neck because he doesn't want to see their officers squabbling and thus avoids arguments for often ridiculous amounts)

      In conclusion, our study of the § 4 of the ISM code lays down a DPA well apart of the normal operational circuit of a shipping company; so much apart that nothing prevents the DPA not being an executive of the company.
      The designated person can come, for example, from the head office, from another part of the group or from a specialized sub-contracting company.
      Numbers of small companies see in this solution the response to their problems and sometimes I see plans to share the same designated person between a few small companies!


      All that is theory … see now what is the real practise!

  1. Inventory of fixtures today:
  2. In real terms, the job of the DPA is not always the same according to companies and their safety culture, and all companies do not have the means "of having" such a qualified person in charge of supervising the operations of the ships everywhere around the world and who will be necessarily "expensive".
    Indeed, I encounter DPA really apart of the operational management only in "rich" companies” or those of a certain size.
    In the others, it is one of the executive officer, already in place who ensures this role. When it is about a person not having responsibilities in the operations, maintenance or safety in general, is acceptable. But when the director of the fleet, already responsible for safety, takes the role of the ISM designated person, it is not acceptable.

    We will study the 3 solutions, one after the other.

    1st case: the DPA is the Safety Officer, the fleet or marine superintendent or his assistant.

    The connection task with the persons on board was traditionally provided by him and ensured with the entire crew. It was sometimes in a form of paternalism, sometimes the Marine superintendent “passed” by the galley or the kitchen before going to see the Captain with the intention of getting information from the field or "gangway gossip”. Information or demand, which would not have passed the Captain's office, can thus theoretically go through this superintendent passage on board! Very strange! Easier said from done!
    And especially it is not immediate; but a letter (or e mail now) directly to the Superintendent is of course also possible in this case.
    Except perhaps a letter or mail sent directly to the marine superintendent which is the traditional method.
    In addition, the fleet or marine superintendent is normally a person who has a direct access to the higher level of the company management.
    So, we see that the connection task required by the ISM Code is ensured.

    The monitoring task N°1 i.e. the monitoring of the safety aspects of ships operations is theoretically possible via the inspections of the Captain himself, other inspections and audits which would be carried out by the Safety Officer or its representatives.
    That is not new either, you have known like me, these “just-retired Captain-inspectors” who accomplished sometimes an entire trip on board and then submitted their reports to the CEO.
    So, in theory, the requirement of monitoring task N°1 is also satisfied.

    The monitoring task N°2 i.e. "monitoring that adequate resources and a support is given to the ship" does not make here much sense except for a request directed towards the engineering department which can be totally independent of the traditional Marine Department. Indeed, the marine superintendent or Safety officer cannot control or monitor himself; to receive a request of which he has the decision and… to make sure that it will be satisfied if it is necessary! Judge and jury, two caps on only one head: it is impossible anyway!
So, this requirement of monitoring is not satisfied in this case.

Finally, this solution thus does not seem in conformity because a requirement of the code cannot be satisfied and we are thus in major nonconformity (definition ISM Code, 2002 ed, § 1.1.10).

From responsibility, also the situation is sensitive (see above)

In this case also, the role of DPA is not easy because there can be contradiction or opposition between a limited budget and a request of a Master which cannot wait.

For a DPA/Superintendent, motivated and convinced of the utility of the ISM Code, such an obstacle could be raised only at the "higher level" with perhaps the effort of persuasion as you can imagine.

Not really in conformity and not easy to run, especially for a motivated DPA.
 
Example of 1st case diagram
    Sd case: The designated person is a manager who does not have already any responsibilities in the ship's operations, safety or maintenance: for example, the financial or marketing or human resources or research and development manager or, better, the quality manager!
    The General Manager or the President specified when he nominated this DPA, that he had a direct link with him and that he could, and even had to contact him constantly when it was necessary.
In this case, it is easier to ensure a reliable link between the personnel on board and the upper management level of the company, to ensure the monitoring of ship's operations for safety and prevention of pollution with the assistance of the Masters, as we have seen above and finally to check that if a support is provided to the captain, he can ensure his task and his responsibilities at all time and not only in emergency.

In this case, the three minimum requirements are satisfied

Then, we can entrust the management of the Company's SMS to the DPA, whereas the code did not envisage it at all, but the 2013 MSC-MEPC circulars have clarified this point.

A well-made SMS, envisages about all the ship's life and the "SMS Manager" should be able with the help of the Captains and all the instruments of the ISM code, "to supervise" or to monitor the operations of each ship in connection with safety and environmental protection.
 
2d case flow chart (example)
    The organization above is satisfactory concerning the conformity with the ISM Code but there is a doubt about the ISM technical skill except if the Company asks for external advice or provides complementary training as required by IMO (MSC-MEPC.7/Cir.6 of October 2007)3.

    NB : In the above cases, even for a small company the ISM structure is at its limits: external auditors have their doubts with good reason: not easy to prove that the system can really work.!
    Indeed, the workload for the person in charge with two caps is often too heavy! However, these companies often choose to use specialized consultants particularly to help them for one of the most significant parts of the internal verification of conformity or operation: the internal audits !
    Sometimes also, these small companies, which belong to a great group, call the corporate HSE department of the group to ensure certain tasks related to the SMS:
    • Hygiene/Safety/Environment Inspections and audits
    • Accidents or near-misses analysis
    • Edition and control of SMS documentation
    • Internal audits, etc…

    3d case: The application of the ISM code led important companies to create an ISM structure with staff, office and budget.
    This structure ensures the total management of the SMS including:

  • Communication between crews and the general manager
  • Communication with the Masters for monitoring activities
  • Verification if resources have been provided by the company following the demands
  • Ensure moderation when some demands are exaggerated
  • Ensure mediation when the refusal of a demand can set the operation of the ship in jeopardy in matter of safety & security
  • Control of effectiveness and evolution of the SMS
  • Edition, corrections, revisions of SMS documents
  • Inspections and organization of internal audits
  • Follow-up of nonconformities or other observations
  • Analysis of the Captains' reviews
  • Analysis of accidents and near misses.
  • Preparation of the Management review
  • Organization of ISM Training on board or ashore
  • Organization of conferences or training courses identified as necessary
  • Regulation watch-over including the analysis of amendments and the transmission of all information to the ships
  • The information of the company on improvements stated
 
    • Recording of DPA's activities and follow up & so on…
    In this case, all the requirements of the code for the designated person are satisfied in addition to the requirements with the § ISM 9, § 11 and mainly the §12.
    In addition, the recommendations of the associated circular are covered So we can go with the ideal diagram shown aside.
    This correct structure is the best undoubtedly for conformity with the ISM code and the associated circulars.

  1. In conclusion:
  2. Only the third solution is satisfactory if we compare to the text of the Code and the associated circulars. It is the only satisfactory solution for the certifier, the company and… for the designated person himself!
    But it is a long day from theory to reality!
    The problem of the designated person does not seem to be highlighted:
    • we sometimes wonder if many of the external auditors have actually read the code before coming! They use only their check list!
    • with certain companies who interpret the code in their own manner; guess why?
    • Even with the ERIKA trial as well as the COSTA CONCORDIA one, this problem was not highlighted enough and not solved unfortunately!

  3. Perhaps we could try ourselves to solve this problem of interpretation?
  4. In an aim of clarification, very frequent at IMO, we could propose the following minor amendements :

    Amendement N° 1
    § 1.4 Functional requirements for a safety management system.
    add a sub paragraph …
    3 Create a designated person structure to ensure:
    • a link between the company's high level and those on board,
    • the monitoring of safety and pollution aspects of company's ship operations
    • adequate resources and shore–based support to the structure are provided as required
    … this is really missing when companies can forget even to nominate a DPA !

    Amendement N° 2 : to complete the § 4 « Designated Person(s) »
    Modify the last sentence :
    « … and ensuring that adequate resources an shore-based support are applied for ships as required »
    This to avoid the confusion with the requirement of support and resources set up in §3.3 for the (DPA and the same requirement for the company's ships in §4
    And to add in fine :
    « … the Designated person(s) should be independant of the company's operational departments » or something similar.»
    NB : this is already the case for the internal auditors (see ISM 12.5)

    Added in 2018- Finally after every maritime accident, the role of the DPA is highlighted only about the support from shore to the ship's master; One of the main part of his role is completely avoided, why?: lack of knowledge, misunderstanding !

  5. Bibliography
    • ISM code 2014 version and the associated MSC-MEPC.7 circulars 6 & 8
    • Report N° 8074 m/v HERALD OF FREE ENTERPRISE "Formal Investigation" dated 24th of July 1987
    • ISM Code: a practical guide to legal and insurance implications (1998) pages 62 to 73 and other publications such as “Cracking the code” 2003 and “The mariner's role in collective evidence” (3d ed 2006) publications by Dr Philip ANDERSON
    • HNC/HND ISM code specialist module for IIMS Diploma in marine surveying
    • AFCAN INFO DPA what a job? www.afcan.org files/réglementation ISM (2003)
2014 rev 2018
Captain Bertrand APPERRY
CLC- FIIMS – ISM surveyor & consultant
bertrand.apperry@orange.fr
Retour au menu
Retour au menu